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JUSTICE ON THE LINE: 
PROSECUTORIAL SCREENING BEFORE 
ARREST 
Adam M. Gershowitz* 
Police make more than eleven million arrests every year. Yet prose-
cutors dismiss about 25% of criminal charges with no conviction being en-
tered. Needless arrests are therefore clogging the criminal justice system 
and harming criminal defendants. For instance, Freddie Gray was fatally 
injured in police custody after being arrested for possession of a switch-
blade knife. Prosecutors later announced, however, that they did not believe 
the knife was actually illegal. If prosecutors had to approve warrantless 
arrests before police could take suspects into custody, Freddie Gray would 
still be alive. Yet prosecutors’ offices almost never dictate who the police 
should or should not arrest. Based on interviews with forty prosecutors’ 
offices across the country, this Article describes how police—not prosecu-
tors—call the shots about who is input into the criminal justice system. 
This Article makes a counter-intuitive argument: we should be giving 
prosecutors more power so they can better protect innocent defendants. 
Prosecutors should be responsible for approving or rejecting all warrant-
less arrests. Early prosecutorial case screening will benefit individuals by 
preventing unnecessary arrests, which in turn will reduce embarrassing 
mug shots, unnecessary bail, loss of employment due to pretrial incarcera-
tion, and wrongful convictions. Avoiding unnecessary arrests will also re-
duce jail overcrowding and reduce the burden on judges, clerks, prosecu-
tors, public defenders, and even the police. At present, prosecutorial 
screening of arrests has been implemented in only a handful of jurisdic-
tions. Prosecutorial prescreening can and should be dramatically ex-
panded across the country to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice 
system and prevent myriad harms to criminal suspects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American criminal justice system is clogged and overflowing.1 Each 
year, police2 arrest more than 11 million individuals.3 Yet prosecutors ultimately 
dismiss about 25% of criminal charges with no conviction being entered.4 Those 
numbers tell us there are inputs needlessly clogging the criminal justice system. 
Jails are holding pretrial detainees who will not end up being prosecuted. Prose-
cutors are dealing with cases they will ultimately dismiss. Public defenders are 
overextended in part because of cases that never should have been on their plate 
in the first place. And, of course, suspects are suffering through needless pretrial 
incarceration. All of this suggests the criminal justice system should do a better 
job screening which cases are input into the system in the first place. 
Police make the arrests and prosecutors only enter the picture later—days 
or even weeks later in some counties.5 But what if it were feasible for prosecutors 
to screen cases at a much earlier stage—prior to arrest? What if some of the 25% 
of ultimately dismissed cases were never input into the system in the first place? 
And what if some of the overcharged cases—for instance, aggravated assault 
felonies that should have been charged as simple assault misdemeanors—could 
be charged at the correct level in the first place? After interviewing prosecutors 
in forty different offices around the country, I was told multiple times that pros-
ecutorial screening at the moment of a warrantless arrest would be “impossible.” 
Yet there is at least one large jurisdiction where prosecutors—not the police—
are calling the shots about who is arrested without a warrant. 
In Harris County, Texas (home to Houston) prosecutors screen cases prior 
to arrest and thus are able to weed out weak cases before they begin to clog the 
system and take up criminal justice resources.6 Every police officer in Harris 
 
 1.  As scholars have repeatedly observed, there are more than 2.2 million people in prisons and jails, with 
many serving incredibly long sentences. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM 
IN AMERICA 1975–2025 10 (2016). Although this Article focuses on the moment of arrest, I do not mean to 
suggest that sentence length has not contributed to mass imprisonment in the United States. One scholar, how-
ever, has boldly asserted that sentence length is not a primary driver of the rise of mass incarceration. See JOHN 
F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 51–
77 (2017). For a persuasive argument that Professor Pfaff is wrong, see Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial 
Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835 (2018). 
 2.  Law enforcement officers have many names—for example, sheriffs, constables, and peace officers—
but for ease of exposition, I refer to all of them in this Article as “police.” 
 3. See Crime in the United States 2013, FBI: UCR, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/persons-arrested/persons-arrested (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). 
 4.  See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS 
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl. 21 (2013). The percentage surely rises when mis-
demeanor cases are included. And some offices have much higher rates. See Bellin, supra note 1, at 846; Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 72–74 (2002). 
 5. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. 
REV. 711, 721 (2017). 
 6. See Interview with Jim Leitner, Bureau Chief of the Grand Jury Intake Division, Harris County, at the 
Harris County District Attorney’s Office (June 5, 2017) [hereinafter Leitner Interview]. 
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County must call into an intake hotline and receive prosecutorial approval for 
every warrantless arrest before taking a suspect to jail.7 Prosecutors have the op-
tion to reject the charges or to insist charges in weak cases be downgraded from 
felonies to misdemeanors prior to jail bookings.8 Because the vast majority of 
arrests are warrantless, these intake prosecutors are conducting an initial review 
of an enormous portion of the criminal justice docket. They are therefore in a 
position to prevent clogs before the system swallows weak cases. 
Unfortunately, Harris County is nearly unique. While two other Texas 
counties have adopted a version of the Harris County approach, interviews with 
nearly forty other large and medium-sized prosecutors’ offices across the nation 
show that prosecutors almost never screen warrantless arrests.9 While many 
prosecutors’ offices operate hotlines so that police can call with questions, the 
police still run the show.10 Across most of the United States, police simply arrest 
suspects and process them into the system, with weak cases languishing until 
prosecutors eventually dismiss or downgrade them days, weeks, or even months 
later.11 
The traditional process in which police make threshold decisions is prob-
lematic for the prosecutors who must handle the cases as well as the sheriffs 
running the overcrowded jails, the clerks and judges handling overflowing dock-
ets, and the public defenders who are already drowning in far too many cases.12 
And the system is even worse for the arrestees who must spend unnecessary time 
in jail, use what little savings they have to post bail, and possibly lose their jobs 
while being detained.13 Moreover, some arrestees suffer further because their 
warrantless arrests are reported to immigration authorities, public housing units, 
and employers, even if the charges are ultimately dropped.14 And, of course, 
some arrestees plead guilty simply to get out of jail before prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys have an opportunity to discover the fatal flaws in their cases.15 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II reports how forty prosecutors’ 
offices around the country interact with police at the moment of warrantless ar-
rests. Part II describes how many prosecutors’ offices have optional hotlines for 
police to call with questions. Yet, because calls are not required, contact between 
police and prosecutors at the point of arrest is relatively rare. Part II then explains 
how the lack of prosecutorial screening allows weak cases to languish for days 
or weeks before a prosecutor decides to dismiss the case or downgrade felony 
charges to misdemeanor charges. Part II also explains how the delay in dropping 
or reducing charges wastes criminal justice resources and deeply harms individ-
uals who would otherwise not have been incarcerated. Part III then describes the 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.; infra notes 250–61 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Sections II.B, III.C. 
 10. See infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 11.  See infra Subsection II.D.2.a. 
 12.  See infra Subsection II.D.3. 
 13.  See infra Subsection II.D.2.c. 
 14.  See infra Subsection II.D.2.d. 
 15.  See infra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
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rigorous screening process in place in Harris County, Texas. Part III explains 
how a prosecutor reviews every case before police make a warrantless arrest and 
take a suspect to jail. Finally, Part IV makes the case that other medium-sized 
and large jurisdictions should follow the Harris County model and screen war-
rantless arrests in real time. Part IV also explores whether it would be feasible 
for states to fund centralized screening offices to be shared by smaller counties. 
II. MOST PROSECUTOR OFFICES HAVE MINIMAL INVOLVEMENT IN PRE-
SCREENING WARRANTLESS ARRESTS BY THE POLICE 
Police officers have enormous power in the United States criminal justice 
system. Legislatures have criminalized a huge number of offenses16 and have 
authorized police to make arrests in most cases, even low-level misdemeanors.17 
This Part explores (A) the relatively limited restrictions the Supreme Court has 
imposed on warrantless arrests; (B) the fairly modest role of most prosecutors’ 
offices in working with police to determine which warrantless arrests to make; 
(C) the reasons why prosecutors’ offices do not exert more influence in police 
decisions to make warrantless arrests; and (D) the problems caused by having 
limited prosecutorial oversight of warrantless arrests by the police. 
A. Minimal Constitutional Restrictions on Arrests, and Delayed Review by 
Prosecutors 
The Supreme Court has lightly regulated police authority to arrest sus-
pects.18 And the Court has imposed no real burden on prosecutors to quickly 
screen those arrests. 
Of course, the Court has long required that police have a warrant to arrest 
a suspect in her home.19 With the exception of a recent decision expanding the 
exigent circumstances doctrine to allow police to create their own exigency,20 
the Court has held a firm and rigorous line at the entrance to the home.21 
Outside of the home is a far different story, however. Courts have long au-
thorized police to arrest without a warrant outside of the home.22 So long as the 
officers have probable cause, they can effectuate an arrest without first having to 
 
 16. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001). 
 17.  See Stephen E. Henderson, “Move On” Orders as Fourth Amendment Seizures, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1, 
36–37. 
 18. See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 321 (2016). 
 19. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). 
 20.  See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011). 
 21.  See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. 
 22.  See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414–17 (1976). 
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check with a judge or a prosecutor.23 And, of course, the vast majority of arrests 
are made without a warrant.24 
Only after a warrantless arrest does the role of the judge formally apply.25 
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Court required that judges review war-
rantless arrests within forty-eight hours.26 The County of Riverside decision of-
ficially puts the burden on judges.27 In many jurisdictions, however, prosecutors 
appear at the probable cause hearing to make the case that probable cause exists 
for the arrest.28 
Some jurisdictions are more rigorous. In about ten states, statutes require a 
probable cause determination within twenty-four hours.29 But additional state 
statutory protection appears to be the exception rather than the rule.30 In most of 
the country, the only hard law governing arrests is the Supreme Court’s mandate 
that there be a probable cause hearing forty-eight hours after arrest. Unless the 
prosecutor’s office has an internal policy to insert itself earlier, that means that it 
is police—not prosecutors—who are deciding initial inputs in the criminal justice 
system.31 Put differently, if the prosecutor does not voluntarily step in earlier 
than required by the Supreme Court, it is police officers—not prosecutors—that 
decide who spends the weekend in jail. As described in Section II.C below, un-
fettered police authority can cause a host of problems. Before proceeding to those 
problems though, it is important to have a sense of how police and prosecutors 
interact prior to arrests being made. Section II.B below reviews the policies and 
practices of more than three-dozen prosecutors’ offices in working with the po-
lice on warrantless arrests. 
 
 23.  At common law, for an officer to make a warrantless arrest on a misdemeanor, the crime had to occur 
“in view” of the officer. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 417–18. Modern decisions, however, have held that the Fourth 
Amendment allows such arrests even if not “in view” of the officer. See, e.g., Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 
F.3d 979, 992 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has never held that a police officer violates the Fourth 
Amendment merely by arresting someone without a warrant for a misdemeanor offense which did not occur in 
the officer’s presence and/or did not involve a breach of the peace.”). 
 24. See Harmon, supra note 18, at 324. 
 25. See id. 
 26.  500 U.S. 44, 55–58 (1991). The Court left some wiggle room by explaining that review within forty-
eight hours could still be unconstitutional if the probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Id. at 
56–57. The Court also recognized that a valid hearing could occur more than forty-eight hours after arrest so long 
as the State could prove a bona fide emergency. Id. at 57. 
 27. See id. at 56–57. 
 28.  Of the forty prosecutor’s offices that responded to my request for information, a few indicated that its 
prosecutors do not appear at the probable cause hearing. See infra notes 89, 144, 157, 240 and accompanying 
text. 
 29.  See ALA. CODE § 15-13-190 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1909 (2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.170 
(West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:20 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §22-5-510 (2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 17.033(a) (West 2019); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.1; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130; MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-212; 
MASS. R. CRIM P. 3.1; see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02 (setting period at thirty-six hours). 
 30.  Most state statutes typically quote language from the County of Riverside decision and state that prob-
able cause hearings must occur without “unnecessary delay.” See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2901 (West 2019). 
 31.  See, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
636 & n.60 (2014) (studying New York City and explaining that although the district attorney’s office can change 
charges before arraignment, it is the police who determine initial charges). 
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B. The Prosecutor’s Role in Warrantless Arrests: Mostly Minimal, But with 
Variations and a Few Exceptions 
Prosecutors typically participate in probable cause hearings within forty-
eight hours of arrest.32 But do prosecutors become involved earlier, even though 
they are not constitutionally required to do so? In particular, I sought to deter-
mine whether offices assign prosecutors to prescreen or otherwise help police 
with warrantless arrests so weak cases are not brought into the criminal justice 
system in the first place.33 In order to answer this question, I contacted prosecu-
tors in the 100 largest counties in the United States as well as a few smaller ju-
risdictions.34 Many offices declined to respond, but I was able to speak or corre-
spond with prosecutors from forty offices.35 
While there certainly is not uniformity,36 the results of my study clearly 
indicate that most prosecutors’ offices do not have significant interaction with 
police at the time of warrantless arrests.37 Numerous offices have either a hotline 
telephone number or a rotating prosecutor on call to answer questions from po-
lice.38 In most jurisdictions, however, phone calls from the police are the excep-
tion, not the rule.39 And when police do call, they are mostly seeking legal guid-
ance for what the officers think are the difficult cases.40 In almost all 
jurisdictions, police do not need to receive permission from prosecutors in order 
to effectuate a warrantless arrest and lock up a suspect.41 In the subsections be-
low, I detail the different approaches prosecutors use to provide guidance to the 
police.  
1. Counties with No Prosecutor Hotline and Very Limited Prosecutorial Role 
in Warrantless Arrests 
In some jurisdictions, prosecutors’ offices have no substantial role in ad-
vising the police whether to make warrantless arrests.42 For instance, a veteran 
prosecutor in Los Angeles explained: 
 
 32. Wright & Miller, supra note 4, at 32 n.9. 
 33. The leading work on prosecutorial screening considers screening at a later stage. See id. 
 34.  Ron Wright and Kay Levine have thoughtfully observed that research on prosecutors’ offices focuses 
too heavily on large jurisdictions. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Place Matters in Prosecution Re-
search, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 675, 679 (2017). 
 35.  I divided the jurisdictions equally with a research assistant. We first called each office in an effort to 
speak with a prosecutor or public information officer who could answer the questions. We then followed up by 
email with an identical set of questions for each office. 
 36.  See Ronald F. Wright et al., The Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27, 28 
(2014) (cautioning against reaching broad conclusions about all prosecutors based on data points from a few 
offices). 
 37. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.1. 
 38. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 39. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 40. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 41. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 42. See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
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[T]he nature of law enforcement in a jurisdiction of our size is such that an 
officer stopping midstream to seek advice on making a warrantless arrest 
is highly unlikely. Most warrantless arrests occur when the officer sees the 
violation occur (such as driving under the influence), or discovers it during 
lawful activity (narcotics found during a lawful search of a parolee, for 
example) . . . . Such situations do not call for prior consultation with the 
prosecutor.43 
This prosecutor further noted that “in my 2 years as a police officer I never con-
sulted a prosecutor before making an arrest; in my 31 years as a prosecutor, I 
don’t recall ever having been asked for such advice before an arrest was made.”44 
The situation in some other California counties is similar. In Fresno 
County, California, the District Attorney’s Office does not maintain a hotline, 
and police only call individual prosecutors for advice on arrests “very very 
rarely” and “only in serious cases.”45 Fresno County prosecutors do not become 
involved in cases until thirty-six to forty-eight hours after arrest.46 Similarly, in 
San Joaquin County, California, a prosecutor explained that we “do not involve 
ourselves in warrantless arrests” although there “may be an unusual case where 
an officer will call an intake/charging deputy during business hours.”47 Prosecu-
tors in San Joaquin typically review the police report the day following the ar-
rest.48 In Kern County, California (home to Bakersfield), the District Attorney’s 
Office does not have a hotline and only reviews cases after they are formally 
submitted to the office, which is within two days for warrantless arrestees in cus-
tody and up to a few weeks later for those no longer in custody.49 Finally, in 
Contra Costa, California, prosecutors “generally do not get involved until the 
case is brought in for filing.”50 When the suspect has been booked and released 
(as happens, for example, in a typical drunk driving case), the prosecutor’s office 
“usually won’t become involved in the case until months later.”51 If the suspect 
is still in custody, prosecutors will typically first look at the case thirty-six to 
forty-eight hours after arrest.52 
Some large prosecutors’ offices in other states likewise do not offer much 
advice to police at the moment of arrest.53 For example, a spokesman for the 
Philadelphia County prosecutor’s office in Pennsylvania explained that “we do 
 
 43.  See E-mail from Devallis Rutledge, Special Counsel to the Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist. Attorney’s 
Office, to author (May 17, 2017) (on file with author). 
 44. Id. Los Angeles County does have a twenty-four hour call-in line for police to speak with a prosecutor, 
but it is primarily for “help obtaining search warrants, wiretaps, or other court orders.” Id. 
 45.  E-mail from Steve E. Wright, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Fresno Cty., to author (May 24, 2017) (on file 
with author). 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See E-mail from Robert Himelblau, Supervising Deputy Dist. Attorney, San Joaquin Cty., to Elizabeth 
Lester (June 15, 2017, 5:37 PM) (on file with author). 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  See E-mail from Mark Pafford, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney, Kern Cty., to Elizabeth Lester (June 19, 
2017, 12:59 PM) (on file with author). 
 50.  See E-mail from Brian Feinberg, Deputy Dist. Attorney, to author (June 16, 2017) (on file with author). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See id. 
 53. See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
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not provide advice about whether or not to arrest a suspect . . . . The police de-
termine whether or not to effectuate an arrest.”54 Thereafter, a case moves to the 
charging unit of the prosecutor’s office, which typically decides within eleven 
hours whether to file charges.55 
The Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office in New York operates sim-
ilarly. Suffolk County does not have a hotline, and prosecutors do not talk with 
police in run-of-the-mill cases, though they do sometimes answer questions 
when police call in specialized cases such as child abuse.56 Like Philadelphia, 
though, Suffolk County prosecutors review cases fairly quickly after arrest, typ-
ically within twelve- to twenty-four hours of a warrantless arrest.57 Similarly, the 
San Francisco County District Attorney’s Office in California does not have a 
hotline for police to call about warrantless arrests, though police can call indi-
vidual departments in the office to ask questions about cases.58 The San Fran-
cisco office stressed that even when police do reach out with questions, prosecu-
tors do not provide conclusions for the police about whether or not there is 
probable cause to make an arrest.59 In the ordinary case, prosecutors only become 
involved in the case about a day after arrest.60 
In Pima County, Arizona prosecutors handle felonies while the Tucson City 
Attorney’s Office handles most misdemeanors.61 Neither jurisdiction has a hot-
line for police to talk with prosecutors prior to arrest.62 For felony cases, a Pima 
County prosecutor reviews the case at the probable cause hearing within twelve 
hours of arrest.63 In misdemeanor cases, judges conduct probable cause reviews 
in the evenings, but prosecutors are only on staff Monday through Friday from 9 
a.m. to 5 p.m.64 If a defendant is arrested on misdemeanor charges during the 
weekend, a prosecutor will not review the case until Monday morning. 
Some medium-sized counties also reported that contact between police and 
prosecutors at the time of arrest is fairly rare.65 For example, in El Paso County, 
Colorado (home to Colorado Springs), the prosecutor’s office does not maintain 
a dedicated hotline for police to consult with prosecutors and calls from police 
 
 54.  E-mail from Cameron L. Kline, Commc’ns Dir. & Spokesperson, Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to 
author (May 18, 2017) (on file with author). 
 55.  See id. 
 56. See Interview with Michael J. Miller, Chief of Appellate Bureau, Suffolk Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office 
(June 20, 2017) [hereinafter Miller Interview]. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  See E-mail from Nikesh Patel, S.F. Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth Lester (July 7, 2017) (on 
file with author). 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  See id. 
 61. See E-mail from Amelia Cramer, Chief Deputy Pima Cty. Attorney, to author (June 2, 2017, 11:03 
AM) (on file with author). 
 62. See id.; Interview with M.J. Raciti, Principal Assistant Prosecuting City Attorney (June 2, 2017) [here-
inafter Raciti Interview]. 
 63.  See E-mail from Amelia Cramer, supra note 61. Thereafter, prosecutors will not review the case again 
for up to eight days. See id. 
 64.  See Raciti Interview, supra note 62. 
 65. See infra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
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occur only on “rare occasions.”66 Likewise, in Salt Lake County, Utah, prosecu-
tors do not maintain a hotline and speak with police about warrantless arrests 
only “occasionally.”67 
In Montgomery County, Maryland, the State’s Attorney’s Office does not 
maintain a hotline, though police have some prosecutors’ cell phone numbers 
and are instructed to call the Deputy State’s Attorney with questions.68 Never-
theless, the Deputy State’s Attorney explained that calls from police to prosecu-
tors are “infrequent” and mostly occur in homicides, cases where juveniles will 
be charged as adults, or cases likely to generate news coverage.69 The Deputy 
State’s Attorney explained that the Montgomery County office would like to in-
teract more with police at the time of warrantless arrests because the “earlier we 
can weigh in on a case” the better.70 Unfortunately, the Montgomery County, 
Maryland State’s Attorney’s Office believes the cost of hiring prosecutors to 
communicate with police at the time of arrest would be prohibitively expensive.71 
In sum, in a number of large and medium-sized counties across the United 
States, police have total discretion to make warrantless arrests and seek virtually 
no feedback from prosecutors in doing so. 
2. Counties with a Dedicated Prosecutor Hotline for Unusual Cases 
In a considerable number of counties, the prosecutor’s office has a system 
set up for police to contact prosecutors if they want guidance prior to making 
warrantless arrests.72 Some jurisdictions maintain a dedicated hotline for police 
to call.73 In other jurisdictions, prosecutors take turns giving out their cell phone 
number to the police and are essentially “on call” the way an obstetrician is for 
delivering babies.74 In all of these jurisdictions, phone calls from the police about 
whether to make a warrantless arrest seem to be the exception and not the rule.75 
The police are not obligated to call prosecutors for guidance and only do so when 
the officers think the case is complicated.76 
For instance, in Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan, there is a rotating list 
of prosecutors who are available for the police to contact about legal issues at 
any time afterhours, seven days a week.77 There is no requirement for police to 
 
 66.  See E-mail from Lee Richards, Pub. Info. Officer, El Paso Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Elizabeth 
Lester (June 15, 2017, 6:07 PM) (on file with author). 
 67.  E-mail from Blake Nakaumura, Salt Lake Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 15, 2017) (on 
file with author). 
 68. See Interview with Peter Feeney, Deputy State’s Attorney, Montgomery Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office 
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call prosecutors, however, and in fact, they only seek input from prosecutors on 
search warrants and other legal matters in a limited set of cases.78 In Franklin 
County (Columbus), Ohio, there is no hotline for police to call, although prose-
cutors in certain divisions give out their cell phone numbers to law enforce-
ment.79 According to a spokesperson in Columbus, “in run-of-the mill type cases 
it is atypical for the prosecutors to get calls from the police, however in our big 
cases, cold cases, sex abuse cases, white collar crime cases, and gang cases, our 
prosecutors do get calls from the police.”80 
Similarly, a prosecutor in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (home to Pitts-
burgh) explained that “we have a monthly on call list that goes out to law en-
forcement . . . . Our prosecutors will often receive calls following an on view 
arrest if the arresting officer wants some guidance on exactly what to charge once 
the suspect is in custody.”81 While the Allegheny prosecutor’s office makes itself 
available to the police to answer complicated legal questions, it “would never 
require a police officer to call us before making an on view arrest.”82 
Numerous jurisdictions that staff prosecutor hotlines report that calls are 
rare.83 Consider the similar approach in three Texas counties. In Fort Bend 
County (in the suburbs of Houston), prosecutors are available twenty-four hours 
a day, but the office reports receiving calls only “a few times weekly.”84 Bexar 
County, Texas (which is home to San Antonio) operates similarly.85 The office 
does not have a hotline, but it does staff a prosecutor twenty-four hours a day to 
be available to answer questions from police.86 The police, however, tend to call 
prosecutors only in cases with unusual facts or tricky legal issues; in run-of-the-
mill cases police do not consult prosecutors.87 In Denton County, Texas, prose-
cutors have a dedicated phone line, but calls from police come only in unusual 
cases and are “fairly rare.”88 Moreover, in Denton County—which has over 
600,000 people—prosecutors “do not attend any probable cause hearings and do 
not have anything to do with the [warrantless arrest] case[s] at all until 
weeks/months later.”89 
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Prosecutors’ offices in other parts of the country also reported that calls 
from police are infrequent.90 For example, in Ventura County, California, if po-
lice have questions, they can call an answering service and be put in touch with 
a prosecutor.91 The prosecutors take turns being on call for one week at a time.92 
Calls are rare, however, and typically happen only in “high profile or unusual 
cases.”93 In Prince George’s County, Maryland, prosecutors are available by 
phone at all hours, but they do not give final direction about whether police 
should charge, and in fact, calls are “pretty rare and only in a high-profile or 
unusual case.”94 Similarly, in Baltimore County, Maryland, calls are not manda-
tory and officers must page a prosecutor on duty to ask question.95 
Lee County, Florida (home to Fort Myers) also has a phone number for 
police to ask questions about probable cause, but the prosecutors “will not tell an 
officer to arrest a person.”96 Calls are “pretty rare” and are typically for “unusual” 
and “high-profile” cases, usually involving murders.97 Indeed, in cases in Lee 
County, the prosecutor does not become involved in the case until arraignment 
and typically reviews the file for the first time “10 to 15 days after arrest.”98 In 
Portsmouth County, a medium-sized county in Virginia, a prosecutor is on call 
twenty-four hours a day to answer questions from police, but phone calls are 
“fairly rare” and typically happen only in unusual cases.99 In the ordinary case, 
prosecutors do not become involved until after arraignment.100 
Finally, in Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota, the prosecutor’s 
office does not have a hotline but has prosecutors available twenty-four hours a 
day to answer questions from police.101 Yet calls from law enforcement are “rare 
and likely [only happen] in serious or high profile crimes.”102 Indeed, the office 
experimented with “having a prosecutor stay [in the office] until 7:00 p.m. to 
answer any questions the police might wish to ask.”103 A prosecutor who partic-
ipated in the pilot program noted, “I almost never got a call and we terminated 
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the experiment.”104 Accordingly, in Hennepin County, prosecutors ordinarily do 
not see cases until thirty-six to sixty hours after arrest.105 
The twelve counties described above have created a specific hotline or call 
procedure for police to seek advice from prosecutors about warrantless arrests. 
Yet all the counties indicated that calls are rare and typically only occur in high-
profile, very serious, or very unusual cases. 
3. Counties with More Frequent Police-Prosecutor Interactions 
Some jurisdictions responded that their prosecutors have more frequent in-
teractions with police about warrantless arrests. For instance, San Diego, Cali-
fornia assigns one prosecutor to be on site at the police department and another 
to be on site at the sheriff’s department.106 These prosecutors are available to 
answer questions from police, for instance in narcotics investigations.107 A thirty-
year veteran prosecutor in the San Diego office, however, explained that prose-
cutors “never tell anyone in law enforcement whether they should arrest someone 
[because] it’s not our job.”108 Rather, in the ordinary case, prosecutors first touch 
the case about forty-eight hours after arrest.109 
Other jurisdictions use a more traditional hotline and report that calls from 
police happen with some frequency. For example, in San Bernardino County, 
California, prosecutors make themselves available to police by phone.110 While 
police are not obligated to speak with prosecutors prior to making warrantless 
arrests, officers do contact prosecutors in a variety of cases when there are legal 
or factual issues they need clarification on.111 Similarly, in Nassau County (Long 
Island), New York, prosecutors staff a hotline twenty-four hours a day, and po-
lice call “fairly frequently” to seek advice on warrantless arrests.112 In Nassau 
County, however, officers are not obligated to call the hotline and the prosecutors 
“do not dictate” when the police should arrest.113 
Multiple offices in Massachusetts indicated that they answer questions 
from police twenty-four hours per day and that calls are not rare.114 In Worcester, 
Massachusetts, calls are not mandatory, but “communication is frequent,” par-
ticularly in homicide and motor vehicle crash cases.115 Just a short drive down 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See id. 
 106. Telephone Interview with David Greenberg, Chief Deputy Dist. Attorney (May 24, 2017) [hereinafter 
Greenberg Interview].  
 107. See id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See id. 
 110. See E-mail from Christopher Lee, San Bernardino Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 1, 2017) 
(on file with author). 
 111.  See id. 
 112.  E-mail from Brendan Brosh, Nassau Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 5, 2017) (on file with 
author). 
 113.  Id. 
 114. See, e.g., E-mail from Paul Jarvey, Deputy Dir. of Commc’ns, Worcester Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 
to Elizabeth Lester (June 19, 2017) (on file with author). 
 115.  Id. 
  
846 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
the road, in Norfolk, Massachusetts, prosecutors also have a twenty-four-hour 
hotline that is staffed by senior attorneys.116 Police are not obligated to seek input 
from prosecutors, but calls are “not at all rare,” nor are they solely for high-pro-
file cases.117 In Essex County, Massachusetts (home to Salem), prosecutors staff 
a phone line so police can consult on “many issues,” including whether to make 
warrantless arrests.118 Nevertheless, even though there are a limited number of 
offenses in Massachusetts for which police can make warrantless arrests, officers 
are not obligated to call because “it would be impossible for police to call us in 
every case.”119 
In Snohomish County, Washington, prosecutors rotate on a weekly basis to 
answer calls from police.120 The officers are not required to call prosecutors prior 
to arrest, but police typically call prosecutors for the most serious felonies, such 
as murder and rape, and they also call when there are unique circumstances.121 
Similarly, in Jefferson County, Kentucky (home to Louisville), certain divisions 
(such as homicide, fraud, child abuse, and consumer protection) have a prosecu-
tor liaison for police to consult with directly about cases.122 Police can call pros-
ecutors at any time of day, though they are not required to do so.123 In Will 
County, Illinois (home to Joliet), police are not obligated to call prior to warrant-
less arrests, but an experienced prosecutor wears a pager twenty-four hours a day 
to answer any questions police may have.124 According to a Will County prose-
cutor, police from larger precincts tend not to call very often, whereas officers 
from smaller precincts do tend to call, though primarily in felony cases.125 In 
Gwinnett, Georgia, police are able to page a prosecutor’s cell phone twenty-four 
hours a day.126 Calls are not mandatory, and according to a Gwinnett County 
prosecutor, police call prosecutors about three or four times a day.127 
A few jurisdictions go further by not only maintaining a hotline for police 
to call but also mandating calls prior to certain types of warrantless arrests. In 
Shelby County, Tennessee (home to Memphis), police officers are required to 
contact the prosecutor’s office prior to making a warrantless arrest for homicide, 
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armed robbery, and some other violent crimes.128 The reason is not only to help 
police select the correct charges but also to ensure that all possible evidence is 
collected.129 In Essex County, New Jersey (home to Newark), prosecutors are 
“involved in the charging decisions in virtually all the [homicide] cases prior to 
arrest” but do not advise the police on lower-level street arrests.130 In Lake 
County, Illinois, prosecutors screen all felony and domestic violence cases prior 
to arrests.131 This amounts to roughly forty calls per day from police to prosecu-
tors.132 
Finally, some prosecutors’ offices counseled that even though hotline calls 
are rare, it is possible that police are calling individual prosecutors who they have 
strong working relationships with. For instance, in Las Vegas, Nevada, the Clark 
County District Attorney’s Office does not have a hotline for police to call with 
questions about warrantless arrests, but it does have a phone number for police 
to call for help with search warrants.133 A Clark County prosecutor explained 
that for every roughly sixty calls to the search warrant number, about four calls 
are from police asking for advice about warrantless arrests.134 The prosecutor 
also explained that some police likely call prosecutors who they work closely 
with.135 
In sum, a number of counties reported that their prosecutors had some in-
teraction with police at the moment of warrantless arrests. In a few of these ju-
risdictions calls were mandatory for certain particularly serious offenses. In 
most, however, the police still had discretion whether to consult with prosecutors 
or not. 
In total, after gathering information from forty large and medium-sized 
prosecutors’ offices, I found very limited prosecutorial prescreening of warrant-
less arrests.136 Some offices acknowledged doing virtually no prescreening.137 
Many offices staff prosecutors to answer calls from the police, but noted that 
calls were infrequent.138 A few prosecutors’ offices reported that calls happen 
regularly but noted that those calls are typically only in the most serious felony 
cases.139 Other offices cautioned that it is impossible to determine the amount of 
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advice being given to police because some police officers check with individual 
prosecutors with whom they have close working relationships.140 Finally, a small 
number of jurisdictions mandate that police clear serious felony arrests with pros-
ecutors in advance. With the exception of one office that required prescreening 
of domestic violence cases, however, none of the offices discussed above re-
quired any prosecutorial involvement in warrantless misdemeanor arrests.141 
A few jurisdictions reported that prosecutors review warrantless arrests 
within twelve hours.142 More commonly, prosecutors stated that they see cases 
for the first time about thirty-six to forty-eight hours after arrest.143 One county 
noted that its prosecutors typically do not see cases until two weeks after arrest, 
while another jurisdiction acknowledged not appearing at the probable cause 
hearing and thus not reviewing warrantless arrests until weeks or months later.144 
C. The Reasons for Limited Prosecutorial Involvement Prior to Arrest 
As detailed above, most jurisdictions have limited involvement in advising 
police prior to warrantless arrests. Prosecutors’ offices offered two main reasons 
why their attorneys do not take a more hands-on role in screening cases at the 
moment of arrest: (1) screening warrantless arrests would be labor-intensive and 
thus prohibitively expensive; and (2) prosecutorial involvement in screening 
warrantless arrests would risk the loss of absolute immunity that courts typically 
afford to prosecutors.145 
A few prosecutors’ offices noted the considerable cost and logistical chal-
lenge of having prosecutors involved in warrantless arrests.146 For instance, the 
Essex County, New Jersey office explained that “[w]ith approximately 250 ar-
rests a week in Newark—the largest city in our jurisdiction—consulting a pros-
ecutor prior to each arrest would be a tremendous undertaking.”147 Similarly, a 
Los Angeles prosecutor stressed the logistical challenge of having prosecutors 
deal with more than 100 law enforcement agencies in a county with a population 
of 10 million people.148 
In addition to logistics and cost, some prosecutors’ offices expressed con-
cerns about exposing their offices and staff to civil liability.149 Prosecutors have 
absolute immunity for actions taken in their prosecutorial capacity.150 When 
prosecutors act in an investigative capacity, however, they are only entitled to 
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qualified immunity.151 Prosecutors in Clark County (Las Vegas); Suffolk, New 
York; Contra Costa, California; Fresno, California; and Los Angeles, California 
all expressed concern that too great of involvement in advising police could re-
sult in the prospect of civil liability.152 Moreover, one New York prosecutor ex-
plained that the legislature had taken steps to authorize indemnification of po-
lice—but not prosecutors—for civil judgments.153 
The cost, logistics, and liability concerns voiced by multiple prosecutors’ 
offices are surely sincere. As explained below, however, limited involvement by 
prosecutors at the moment of warrantless arrest likely results in a large number 
of weak cases being put into the criminal justice system.154 This has ramifications 
for jailers, defendants, clerks, judges, public defenders, and the prosecutors 
themselves. 
D. Problems with Limited Prosecutorial Oversight of Police Decisions to 
Make Warrantless Arrests 
As Section II.B demonstrates, in the vast majority of cases, police make 
warrantless arrests without first consulting a prosecutor. In many counties, how-
ever, there is no prosecutorial review of warrantless arrests for thirty-six to forty-
eight hours, until the judge conducts a probable cause hearing.155 And at that 
hearing, prosecutors may not examine the case thoroughly.156 In two jurisdictions 
I spoke with, prosecutors do not even appear at the probable cause hearing and 
do not become involved in the case until weeks or months later.157 Late and lim-
ited prosecutorial review creates a number of problems for not just the arrestees 
but also for prosecutors and other actors in the criminal justice system. 
1. Evidence Collection and Trial Problems for Prosecutors Down the Road 
If prosecutors are not consulted about warrantless arrests, they are not able 
to communicate to police the need to seize and log certain evidence. Police are 
trained investigators, but they typically have very little legal training and may 
not be well positioned to understand all of the evidence the prosecution may need 
to prove each element of a case.158 
For example, in a domestic assault case, a patrol officer might not recognize 
the importance of taking pictures of all of the victim’s injuries at the scene. If the 
complainant tells the officer she plans to press charges, the officer may take the 
suspect into custody and assume the victim will cooperate with prosecutors down 
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the road to demonstrate her injuries. Unfortunately, many domestic violence vic-
tims later recant their complaints and refuse to cooperate with the prosecution.159 
Weeks later, the victim’s injuries will no longer be visible and without photo-
graphs the prosecutor will have to dismiss the case.160 
Police might also fail to appreciate the importance of forensic testing. Po-
lice might not insist a nurse conduct a forensic examination of a sexual assault 
victim, thus losing valuable evidence.161 Or police might erroneously assume that 
because forensic testing is unlikely to turn up fingerprints or DNA that it is not 
worth doing. Yet, as prosecutors know, not testing evidence (even if it is unlikely 
to turn up anything incriminating) can be devastating in the eyes of a jury. For 
instance, if police do not test a gun or a bag for fingerprints or DNA, the defense 
attorney can turn to the jury and say: “The police did not even test for possible 
evidence!” Because police do not have experience trying cases, they do not have 
the same perspective as prosecutors who know the importance of checking all of 
the boxes in the eyes of the jury.162 
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2. Harm to Arrestees Caused by Lack of Prosecutorial Involvement 
a. Unnecessary Arrests: Police File Charges That Prosecutors Would 
Not Have Brought 
Police arrest suspects in some—perhaps many—cases that prosecutors 
never would have arrested in.163 At a broad level, we know this because prose-
cutors dismiss an enormous percentage of cases after police have filed charges.164 
On average, prosecutors dismiss 25%165 of felony charges, and in some jurisdic-
tions that number can be as high as 40% or 50%.166 In her recent study of New 
York City, Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann found that prosecutors declined to 
prosecute between 17,000 and 30,500 misdemeanor arrests each year.167 There 
are at least two big-picture types of cases prosecutors dismiss outright without a 
plea bargain: (1) cases in which prosecutors recognize they could never prove 
the necessary elements of the crime charged; and (2) cases in which the prosecu-
tor could prove all of the elements but determines, in the interest of justice, that 
some or all of the charges should be dismissed. 
Let’s start with the cases that prosecutors cannot prove. Imagine that a po-
lice officer sees someone driving erratically and the officer turns on his siren and 
lights to pull over the car. Imagine also that the driver, while not speeding, does 
not immediately pull over his vehicle. The officer arrests the driver not for the 
original traffic offense, but for evading arrest because of the delay in pulling 
over. It is not uncommon for police to claim a suspect was evading arrest.168 
Prosecutors know, however, that to prove evasion they must show that the driver 
intentionally fled from a person he knew was a law enforcement officer.169 But 
the driver might not have initially seen the police car in his rear-view mirror. Or 
the driver might not have pulled over immediately because he was nervous and 
did not see a place to safely pull off the road. Or, even if those stories are not 
true, the prosecutor knows that a defense attorney could very easily convince a 
jury that reasonable doubt exists.170 So, while police are keen to arrest for evad-
ing arrest, prosecutors are not.171 
Consider the related crime of resisting arrest. Imagine that a police officer 
is making a valid arrest for driving while intoxicated. The officer pulls the 
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driver’s hands behind his back to handcuff them. The driver—perhaps because 
he is drunk and not in firm control of his bodily movements, or perhaps because 
having his hands pulled by the officer is painful—recoils and pulls his hands 
away from the officer. In this common scenario, police sometimes seek charges 
for resisting arrest. Prosecutors, on the other hand, are more skeptical and ulti-
mately dismiss some of the resisting cases.172 
Similarly, when a suspect or his family or friends are verbally abusive dur-
ing an arrest, police often want to file additional charges for making a terroristic 
threat because the suspect has threatened imminent violence.173 These charges 
can be legitimate if the suspect makes a realistic and imminent threat, but often 
suspects are simply mouthing off and engaged in tough talk. Prosecutors often 
dismiss these charges.174 
Examples are not limited to the “contempt of cop” situations outlined 
above. Police and prosecutors see many cases differently, with police often fo-
cused on the moment of arrest, while prosecutors think about whether a convic-
tion is likely.175 For example, as Professor Alexandra Natapoff has observed, 
police sometimes arrest “to clear a street corner, to manifest a police presence in 
a high-crime neighborhood, [or] to induce cooperation from potential wit-
nesses.”176 Similarly, according to sociologist and former police officer Peter 
Moskos, police in Baltimore regularly order people to “move on” and arrest them 
if they do not comply.177 In New York, between 1992 and 2004, police continued 
to make thousands of loitering arrests even after the Second Circuit had struck 
down the loitering statute and enjoined the City from filing charges under it.178 
Police may think that arresting in these types of cases is the appropriate course 
of action for “maintaining order,”179 but prosecutors will often dismiss these 
cases because they are impossible to prove.180 
Or imagine that an individual brings a gun through airport security—a 
problem that happens more than 3,000 times per year in the United States.181 
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Many law enforcement officers want to file charges for bringing a weapon into 
a prohibited area, surely because they think charges are truly merited.182 Yet 
prosecutors know that those cases are very difficult to prove.183 Defendants can 
make a plausible (and often true) claim that they simply forgot the weapon was 
in the bag.184 Because some state statutes require the defendant to have intention-
ally brought the weapon into an airport,185 many prosecutors will dismiss those 
charges.186 
In addition to cases that are difficult to prove, prosecutors sometimes dis-
miss cases as a matter of justice, even though police would have followed 
through on charges.187 For example, one former prosecutor relayed a story of 
police seeking to arrest a suspect for siphoning $40 worth of gas out of an auto-
mobile.188 Police sought to charge the suspect with burglary of a motor vehicle—
a felony—because theft of $40 was a low-level offense that carried no jail 
time.189 Although the prosecutor recognized that it might be theoretically possi-
ble to meet the elements of the burglary statute by siphoning gas, she believed in 
the interests of justice that the case did not merit felony charges.190 
Or imagine that police catch a suspect with half-a-dozen different types of 
drugs and arrest him for intent to distribute. Each different type of drug is a dif-
ferent offense, and the police officer may want to charge six offenses. The pros-
ecutor, however, may not see the point in filing six separate charges and will 
instead drop most of the charges for the less serious drugs.191 
Finally, while most police are honorable and hardworking, some depart-
ments pressure officers to numerically justify what they have done on their 
shifts.192 An officer with few or no arrests might have worked hard and effec-
tively for the community but have no way to show it to superior officers. In a 
world where CompStat is prevalent and officers in some departments are pres-
sured to bring in good statistics,193 it should not be surprising that police might 
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(either purposefully or subconsciously) make more arrests than prosecutors 
would make. 
In short, there is good reason to believe that there would be considerably 
fewer arrests if police consulted with prosecutors at the moment of a warrantless 
arrest. These “unnecessary arrests” are not simply erased when prosecutors later 
drop the charges. To the contrary, as explained below, arrestees suffer consider-
able harm up to and after the charges are dismissed. 
b. Arrest Reports and Mug Shots: The Internet Remembers 
For defendants, an unnecessary arrest is not just about spending a night (or 
many nights) in jail. Unnecessary arrests also create unwanted publicity and a 
permanent internet record that can hinder the arrestee for years to come.194 
First, many newspapers publish a police blotter that lists all arrests made 
by the police.195 Once printed, the arrest record exists on the Internet forever and 
can negatively impact a suspect when applying for a job.  
Additionally, arrestees are photographed, and increasingly their mug shots 
are placed into the public domain.196 Local newspapers and media outlets publish 
some mug shots, with prostitution cases being a common example.197 Worse yet, 
dozens of enterprising (and unseemly) companies publish mug shots on their 
websites in an effort to extort money.198 Some of these websites invite individu-
als to pay anywhere from $30 to $400 to remove their mug shots.199 But, of 
course, even if the individual pays, the mug shot may simply turn up on another 
site,200 and the individual will have to turn to expensive removal services to clean 
up their internet profile.201 
If an arrestee’s mug shot remains on the internet—as many of them do—it 
will be easily discoverable by potential employers. In some instances, this may 
be a good thing: society does not want dangerous people being hired to work 
with children and other vulnerable populations. For many individuals, however, 
a prior arrest—perhaps from when they were in college—is no longer relevant. 
It is particularly irrelevant if the charges were dropped and the person was never 
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convicted of a crime.202 Yet if the mug shot is the first thing that shows up in an 
internet search, it will surely have a deleterious effect when the person applies 
for work.203 For instance, in one high-profile case, a domestic violence victim 
who was wrongfully arrested by the police had to contend with her mug shot 
being all over the internet as she finished medical school and sought employ-
ment.204 
Put simply, when police decide to make a warrantless arrest, the conse-
quences may last forever, even if the criminal case is ultimately dismissed. 
c. Bail Costs Money, and Inability to Post Bail Leads to Job Loss 
The next obvious problem with unnecessary arrests is the cost of bail. In 
the not-so-distant past, arrestees were commonly released on their own recogni-
zance.205 Not so any longer.206 Now a majority of felony defendants in large 
counties have to come up with cash to get out of jail.207 Recognizance bonds in 
misdemeanor cases are still common, but in many places they are far less com-
mon than in the past.208 For suspects who are middle-class or wealthy, this is 
obviously not much of a problem. They post a cash bond and, if they comply 
with the conditions of their release, they receive the cash back when their case is 
dismissed.209 
Most suspects are not wealthy or even middle-class, however.210 Most ar-
restees are poor and do not have thousands of dollars, or even hundreds of dol-
lars, available to use for bail.211 Some poor suspects therefore turn to family to 
scrape together bail money. Families then undergo hardship by selling their pos-
sessions or foregoing basic life necessities to come up with bail money.212 
More commonly, bail amounts are simply too high for the suspect and his 
family to meet. Arrestees therefore turn to bail bondsman who will post the entire 
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bond if the suspect pays 10% up front.213 The rub, however, is that even if all 
goes well and the case is dismissed, the bondsman keeps the 10%.214 And 10% 
can be a lot of money for poorer members of society. For example, the bail sched-
ule in Los Angeles, California sets bail at $5,000 for loitering on private property, 
$20,000 for battery of a police officer, and $25,000 for making criminal 
threats.215 If the suspect is fortunate enough to come up with 10% to pay the bail 
bondsman, he will have spent hundreds or even thousands of dollars, which may 
be the difference between paying next month’s rent and being out on the street. 
Matters will be far worse though for the arrestees who cannot afford the 
10% to pay a bail bondsman and who must remain in jail.216 These arrestees will 
remain incarcerated for weeks or months. Unable to make it to work, many will 
lose their jobs, which in turn will cause a cascade of other financial and basic life 
problems. Some vulnerable populations—those in drug treatment or homeless 
shelters—may lose their beds in the facilities.217 They might even suffer violence 
while incarcerated. For example, in 2014, Tyrone Tomlin was arrested for pos-
session of drug paraphernalia because a police officer incorrectly believed his 
soda straw was paraphernalia for snorting cocaine.218 The judge set bail at 
$1,500, but Tomlin was living paycheck to paycheck and had no money to 
spare.219 He was sent to Riker’s Island for three weeks, where he was brutally 
assaulted by other inmates.220 Only weeks later did prosecutors look carefully at 
his case and dismiss the charge.221 
d. Wrongful Guilty Pleas, Lost Wages, Anxiety, and Collateral Costs of 
Unnecessary Arrests 
Mug shots and bail are two obvious consequences of being arrested, but the 
pain of the criminal justice process does not end there. 
For some misdemeanor arrestees, an unnecessary arrest leads to a wrongful 
conviction. If a suspect cannot make bail, he will be incarcerated while he waits 
for a prosecutor to review his case.222 And in some jurisdictions, prosecutors do 
not appear at the probable cause hearing.223 Indeed, in some offices, prosecutors 
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do not look at warrantless arrest cases until days or weeks later.224 In those in-
stances, the arrestee may simply plead guilty to get out of jail and get back to his 
family and his job.225 This pressure causes innocent individuals to plead guilty.226 
For those who make bail, there will be future court appearances. This means 
taking time off from work and suffering anxiety and uncertainty.227 Prosecutors 
are extremely busy and may not focus enough attention on a case to dismiss it at 
the first court appearance.228 A prosecutor’s later dismissal of a case does not 
restore the lost wages or undo emotional turmoil that accompanies the court ap-
pearances. 
And then there are the collateral consequences outside the criminal justice 
system. For example, although the arresting officer may not know it, arrest rec-
ords are used to make immigration removal decisions.229 Public housing author-
ities use arrest records to initiate eviction proceedings for failure to comply with 
leasing provisions about engaging in criminal activity.230 Employers and licens-
ing entities use arrest information to monitor the off-duty activities of their work-
ers.231 As Professor Eisha Jain explains, a “significant number of employers now 
also receive notifications whenever an employee is arrested and fingerprinted” 
and “[s]ome employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the ar-
rest.”232 Some police departments also notify social services after a custodial par-
ent has been arrested.233 
In sum, even if a prosecutor dismisses a case shortly after arrest, much dam-
age will already have been done. The individual will have suffered lost wages, 
anxiety, and a host of noncriminal collateral consequences. Not surprisingly, 
poor and minority individuals are more likely to suffer these consequences.234 
3. Burdening Other Criminal Justice Actors 
Unnecessary arrests also impose a burden on other actors working in the 
criminal justice system. First, and most obviously, the police themselves are bur-
dened by unnecessary arrests. An average arrest takes several hours of officer 
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time.235 That paperwork—which most officers hate236—takes them off the street 
and away from protecting the public. 
Following arrest, suspects are jailed. Some suspects will quickly make bail 
and leave the jails. But those who cannot afford the bail amount will languish, 
possibly for days or weeks. Many jails are overcrowded,237 and each additional 
inmate makes the facility more dangerous not just for the inmates but the sher-
iff’s deputies who must safeguard the inmates.238 And incarcerating inmates is 
expensive. The average jail detention costs hundreds of dollars per day.239 Un-
necessary arrests thus make jails more crowded, more expensive, and less safe. 
Then there are the courtroom employees. Clerks must process all the cases. 
Judges must hold probable cause hearings. In many jurisdictions, prosecutors 
also appear at the probable cause hearings and must spend time, however fleet-
ing, on these unnecessary arrests.240 
If the case survives the probable cause hearing—and almost everyone 
agrees that the probable cause stage is not a stringent review241—then the case 
will fully enter the system. Because the overwhelming majority of criminal de-
fendants are indigent, they will be assigned to a public defender or receive an 
appointed a lawyer.242 And, as almost everyone knows, indigent defense lawyers 
in many jurisdictions have enormous caseloads that prevent them from devoting 
sufficient attention to each client.243 
Of course, we should not hesitate to ask police, jailers, clerks, judges, pros-
ecutors, and defense attorneys to do their jobs. But when the system is over-
loaded, should they be spending time—collectively, enormous amounts of 
time—on cases that will be dismissed and could have been screened out of the 
system up front? The answer to that question should be “no,” and Part III below 
describes a framework for prosecutorial screening of warrantless arrests. 
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III. THE HARRIS COUNTY APPROACH: PROSECUTORIAL SCREENING BEFORE 
ALL WARRANTLESS ARRESTS 
Up until the early 1970s, police in Harris County, Texas (home to Houston) 
filed charges by bringing cases to a justice of the peace.244Although the justices 
of the peace were supposed to reject cases in which all elements of the crime 
could not be proven, in practice, the judges and their administrative clerks were 
not an effective screening mechanism.245 Prosecutors were frustrated because 
they were spending a considerable amount of time on weak cases they believed 
should not have been filed in the first place.246 In 1973, the elected district attor-
ney wrestled initial control of the cases away from the justices of the peace and 
established an “intake” office in which prosecutors, rather than judges or admin-
istrative clerks, would vet the cases brought in by police.247 Over four decades 
later, Harris County continues to have an intricate system in place in which pros-
ecutors screen all warrantless arrests before charges are filed and before suspects 
are taken to jail.248 
A. The Structure of the Harris County Intake Process 
In Harris County, police officers cannot make any warrantless arrest with-
out first calling the “intake hotline” and receiving approval from a prosecutor.249 
If a prosecutor approves charges, the police can process the arrest; if the prose-
cutor rejects the charges, the officer must release the suspect.250 In short, no sus-
pect can be locked up in Harris County without the case first being approved by 
a prosecutor. The process is quite intricate and has multiple checkpoint stages at 
which a prosecutor can reject charges. 
The Harris County process starts with the officer making a call to the intake 
hotline and explaining the situation on the street to one of the intake prosecu-
tors.251 If the prosecutor believes charges would be improper, the officer does 
not make the arrest and instead releases the suspect.252 If the prosecutor believes 
charges are merited, the officer then types up the defendant’s name, the charges, 
the names of any witnesses, a statement of probable cause for the arrest, and the 
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name of the intake prosecutor who approved the charges.253 The officer then in-
puts that information into a computer database.254 Thereafter, an administrative 
assistant in the District Attorney’s Office prints the file255 so that an intake pros-
ecutor—typically someone other than the prosecutor who answered the phone 
call—can review it when there is a lull in calls to the hotline.256 This prosecutorial 
review is effectively a second bite at the apple. If there was a miscommunication 
during the initial phone call or if the screening prosecutor has concerns about the 
arrest, the prosecutor still has the option to reject charges.257 The paper screening 
of the case typically occurs within two hours of arrest.258 
After the initial phone call and the paper copy review, the case proceeds to 
a third review.259 A different felony prosecutor in charge of the probable cause 
docket reviews the case and brings it before the magistrate who is conducting the 
probable cause hearings.260 This prosecutor—usually the third prosecutor to look 
at the case—also has the authority to reject charges and order the suspect re-
leased.261 Because there are typically nine probable cause dockets per day, this 
third prosecutor usually screens each case within a few hours of the initial ar-
rest.262 
In sum, three different Harris County prosecutors typically review each 
warrantless arrest before the case ever gets to a magistrate.263 The first prosecutor 
is in a position to stop the arrest from happening in the first place. The next two 
prosecutors are in a position to dismiss the case shortly after arrest and have the 
suspect released. 
Running such an elaborate intake system is a considerable staffing commit-
ment. There are typically five prosecutors assigned to the intake office at any 
given time.264 A division chief, who is a high-ranking senior attorney, oversees 
the entire intake system.265 Two senior felony prosecutors—one who answers 
intake calls and does paper screening and the other who is in charge of the prob-
able cause docket—work full-time in that department.266 Another two lawyers 
who are more junior felony or misdemeanor prosecutors also answer calls to the 
 
 253. See Leitner Interview, supra note 6. 
 254. Id. 
 255.  A copy also goes to the clerk’s office. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
  
No. 3] JUSTICE ON THE LINE  861 
hotline.267 In addition, there are three secretaries who handle the paperwork.268 
These eight employees work the daytime shift.269 
Importantly, Harris County also fully staffs the intake division after tradi-
tional business hours have ended.270 Dozens of prosecutors from other parts of 
the office agree to work after-hours intake shifts in exchange for overtime pay.271 
The first overtime shift runs from 5 p.m. to midnight, and the second intake shift 
runs from 12 a.m. to 8 a.m.272 Additionally, all weekend shifts are staffed by 
prosecutors working for overtime pay.273 The overtime pay is not a flat rate, but 
rather is based on a multiple of each prosecutor’s base salary.274 Accordingly, 
more experienced senior prosecutors are paid more and have a strong financial 
incentive to work the overtime intake shifts. Because multiple prosecutors and 
staff are working intake shifts twenty-four hours a day, the system is expensive 
to operate. The 2014–2015 budget for the division was $6.2 million.275 
B. Cost and Efficiency Savings Under the Harris County Model 
Although exact numbers are not available, it appears that Harris County 
intake prosecutors reject a considerable number of charges requested by police 
officers. In a 2006 study, researchers at Texas A&M University interviewed 
“prosecutors and Houston police [and] conservatively estimate[d] the rate of 
early case rejection (i.e., while the defendant is still on the street) to be at least 
ten percent.”276 In reviewing the Harris County system, I spoke with current and 
former Harris County prosecutors, reviewed written declination files from the 
intake office, and observed an evening intake shift.277 Although anecdotal, all of 
those data points suggested to me that prosecutors reject charges with some fre-
quency. 
The type of charges Harris County prosecutors reject run the gamut. For 
example, in my review of charges that Harris County prosecutors rejected over 
the weekend of June 3–4, 2017, I saw two cases in which police officers from 
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two different departments sought charges against suspects for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.278 The police officers—certainly in good faith—looked 
at their databases and saw that these two defendants were on deferred adjudica-
tion for felony charges.279 However, because the officers did not have an intricate 
understanding of Texas law, they did not understand that deferred adjudication 
does not count as a conviction and thus those individuals were not felons for 
purposes of the felon in possession statute.280 In short, it would be impossible to 
convict them because they could not be felons in possession under Texas law.281 
Nevertheless, the police officers sought to arrest the two suspects and, in any 
other jurisdiction, the two individuals likely would have been incarcerated for 
days or longer, until a prosecutor looked at the case and dismissed the charges.282 
Because the officers had to preclear the arrests with a Harris County intake pros-
ecutor, however, the suspects were released at the scene.283 
I observed written reports of other cases from the weekend of June 3–4 
where prosecutors rejected charges because, unbeknownst to the police, it would 
be impossible to prove all the elements of the offense.284 For instance, a police 
officer tried to arrest a suspect for possession of a fraudulent credit card.285 The 
intake prosecutor however rejected the charge because the police officer did not 
have any evidence—as the statute requires—that the individual had tried to use 
the card.286 In another case, an officer tried to arrest a defendant for Class B theft, 
but the prosecutor rejected the charge because there was no evidence the property 
was worth more than $100, as the statute requires to arrest a person for theft.287 
Other cases where intake prosecutors rejected charges fall under the general 
heading of “contempt of cop.” In one case from the weekend of June 3–4, officers 
sought charges for a “terroristic threat” because the suspect was threatening the 
officers with violence.288 The threat, however, was not “imminent” as required 
by the statute, and the intake prosecutor rejected the charge.289 In interviews, 
former prosecutors told me that police often try to charge suspects with the 
crimes of “evading arrest with a motor vehicle” or “resisting arrest” because the 
suspects did not pull over quickly or because they pulled their hands away while 
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being handcuffed.290 These former prosecutors explained that intake prosecutors 
often reject these charges because proving the mens rea would be impossible.291 
In other cases, Harris County prosecutors reject charges because police fail 
to understand that it will be difficult or impossible for prosecutors to prove the 
necessary mens rea to convict the suspect. For example, as noted above,292 for-
mer prosecutors explained that airport police officers often want to file charges 
when a passenger is found to have a weapon in his carry-on bag at airport secu-
rity.293 Prosecutors, however, often reject those charges because the statute re-
quires an intentional mens rea, rather than recklessness or negligence, and prov-
ing an intentional mens rea is very difficult. Indeed, while observing an intake 
shift on the evening of June 5, 2017, I witnessed a prosecutor reject charges for 
a suspect after a TSA agent found a large knife in his bag at the airport. 
In other cases that I observed, prosecutors rejected what they considered 
unnecessary extra charges. In one example, officers sought two charges for evad-
ing arrest, but the prosecutor determined that all of the misconduct occurred in 
one transaction and thus filed only one count. In another case, police submitted 
multiple drug charges even though the defendant was in possession of only one 
drug. The prosecutor filed only one count. Indeed, I saw multiple instances in 
which prosecutors filed fewer drug charges than police requested. In one in-
stance, police wanted to charge a defendant with .63 grams of cocaine and .04 
grams of methamphetamine. The prosecutor accepted the former charge, but re-
jected the latter as unnecessary. 
I also observed prosecutors repeatedly reject charges that would cause ju-
dicial backlogs. When police bring in both felony and misdemeanor charges, 
Harris County intake prosecutors often decline to file some of the misdemeanor 
charges out of judicial economy. For instance, I observed one intake call in which 
police stopped a woman for driving while intoxicated with a child in the vehicle. 
The officer also sought charges for drug possession, and a misdemeanor charge 
for unlawful possession of a firearm. The prosecutor declined the firearm charge 
because misdemeanor charges are processed in a different court and a defendant 
would be unlikely to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge when she has pending 
felony charges in another court that have not been resolved. Rather than have a 
low-level case clog the docket in misdemeanor court, the prosecutor chose not to 
file the gun charge and proceeded only on the felony charges. This streamlin-
ing—which likely would not have happened in the absence of a prosecutor intake 
office—upsets some police officers, who may believe that suspects should be 
charged for all of the offenses they have plausibly committed.294 
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Intake prosecutors also decline to file charges as a matter of justice. For 
example, police officers are now frequently present in, or called to, public 
schools.295 When a fight breaks out between high school teenagers, the police 
sometimes want to charge one or both of the students.296 Prosecutors, however, 
sometimes decline to file those charges because they do not believe the teenagers 
should have a criminal record for a high school fight.297 
These anecdotal examples indicate that Harris County prosecutors regu-
larly screen out weak, inefficient, and unjust charges prior to arrest.298 Further 
evidence can be found in Harris County’s low dismissal rate. A working paper 
by Pablo Ormachea and colleagues from the Center for Science and Law used a 
criminal records database to assess the number of “no action” dispositions and 
found the number in Harris County to be dramatically lower than in other juris-
dictions.299 For instance, in 2011, Harris County dropped 1,177 charges, com-
pared with 35,030 in Miami-Dade County.300 
The benefits of the Harris County intake system are not limited to rejecting 
charges. Having a prosecutor work with a police officer at the time of arrest 
strengthens cases that will be filed. For instance, while observing the intake shift 
on June 5, 2017, I observed the chief of the intake division—who has three dec-
ades of experience as a prosecutor and defense attorney—explain to an officer 
that he needed additional information in order to successfully prosecute a suspect 
for possession of marijuana in a drug-free school zone. In his report, the officer 
had failed to identify the name and location of the school as required by the stat-
ute.301 If the prosecutor had not instructed the officer to correct this omission 
immediately, it is possible that weeks later when the problem was discovered 
that the officer might not have remembered the location and the case would have 
to be dismissed. A similar problem occurs when police seek charges for theft of 
a firearm. The officers do not always understand that finding a defendant in pos-
session of a seemingly stolen firearm is not sufficient. Prosecutors must prove 
the firearm has been taken from its owner, and thus the charging documents must 
specify the name of the owner.302 
Prosecutor involvement at the arrest stage also allows for a more careful 
look at bond amounts and helps to keep dangerous individuals off the street. In 
many states, including Texas, the Penal Code sets forth a complicated scheme of 
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charging enhancements.303 In one case I observed during the June 5, 2017, intake 
shift, police sought a charge that would typically have carried a $1,000 bond 
under the bond schedule. When the intake prosecutor looked carefully at the de-
fendant’s criminal history, though, he was able to deconstruct the long rap sheet 
and determine that the defendant had two prior serious felony convictions with 
time spent in the state penitentiary. At the moment of arrest, the prosecutor there-
fore was able to make a recommendation that the defendant be treated as a ha-
bitual offender and the suspect be denied bond. A magistrate judge might have 
made the same discovery from reviewing the defendant’s criminal history, but 
not necessarily. 
In sum, by prescreening warrantless arrests, Harris County prosecutors are 
able to prevent flawed cases from being filed, reduce the number of charges to 
prevent clogs in the system, and screen out charges that while technically appro-
priate might be unjust. At the same time, prosecutors are able to strengthen cases 
that will be filed by having police acquire key information immediately rather 
than scrambling for it days or weeks after charges are filed. 
  
 
 303. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42 (West 2019). 
  
866 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
C. Replicating the Harris County Approach in El Paso and Montgomery 
Counties 
One objection to the Harris County system of prosecutorial prescreening of 
warrantless arrests is that it is labor intensive and expensive. Harris County is the 
third largest county in the country and therefore has a substantial budget and a 
large enough number of employees to have some prosecutors work in its intake 
division.304 By contrast, smaller jurisdictions have less money and smaller staffs 
and would thus find it difficult to fund an intake division. This concern is obvi-
ously logical. Nevertheless, the Harris County approach has been replicated in 
the far smaller El Paso and Montgomery counties in Texas. Moreover, those 
counties have discovered that they are actually saving money by using the Harris 
County approach. 
1. El Paso Recognized the Cost and Efficiency Savings Two Decades Ago 
In 1994, El Paso County, Texas—which has a population six times smaller 
than Harris County305—decided to replicate the Harris County intake system. 
Prosecutors began to screen warrantless arrests twenty-four hours a day.306 Be-
cause El Paso is a much smaller jurisdiction, it only has one prosecutor work the 
intake shift at a time, rather than the three or four prosecutors working simulta-
neously in Harris County.307 The El Paso police (a city agency) and the prosecu-
tor’s office (a county department) reached a formal financial arrangement and 
drew up an interlocal governmental agreement to distribute the costs of the sys-
tem.308 City and county officials have supported the program for over twenty 
years because they believe it ultimately saves money by (1) reducing the number 
of people incarcerated; (2) reducing the time of each defendant’s pretrial incar-
ceration; and (3) reducing time spent on cases by prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
and courts.309 
A 2006 study by researchers at Texas A&M University offered dramatic 
documentation of the financial savings that come when prosecutors prescreen 
arrests and file charges electronically from their office.310 Researchers compared 
misdemeanor cases disposed of in calendar year 2004 in Harris, El Paso, and 
Bexar counties in Texas.311 In Harris County, all of the cases were screened by 
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prosecutors at the moment of arrest.312 In Bexar County, none were screened.313 
In El Paso (in 2004), the cases handled by the El Paso Police Department—about 
two-thirds of the total—were screened by prosecutors at the moment of arrest, 
while the cases handled by the El Paso Sheriff’s Office were not screened by 
prosecutors.314 
The researchers found that El Paso prosecutors rejected 19% of the cases 
that city police officers brought in.315 In total, El Paso prosecutors rejected thou-
sands of misdemeanor cases where police sought charges.316 From a financial 
standpoint, the study found that if El Paso moved to a system in which prosecu-
tors screened all misdemeanor cases, it would save the county approximately 
$1.5 million in costs associated with transportation, jailing, offense report sub-
mission, magistrate appearances, and appointed counsel.317 It also would save 
the prospective defendants an estimated $1.23 million that they would have spent 
on bond, retained counsel, and lost wages had they been incarcerated.318 And, of 
course, this would be just the savings in misdemeanor cases. 
Although there was not comparable data for Harris County, the researchers 
reported that “prosecutors and Houston police interviewed conservatively esti-
mate the rate of early case rejection (i.e., while the defendant is still on the street) 
to be at least ten percent.”319 Given that Houston handles roughly five times as 
many cases as El Paso,320 the savings to Harris County and its defendants are 
likely dramatically greater than those outlined above for El Paso. 
Additionally, because prosecutors in Harris County and El Paso County 
screened the cases at the moment of arrest and could electronically file the doc-
uments themselves without waiting for paperwork to be sent over from the po-
lice, cases that did result in arrest were processed far faster.321 In Harris County 
(where all cases go through the intake office), 25% of misdemeanor cases were 
disposed of within three days of arrest; in El Paso (where, at the time, two-thirds 
of misdemeanor cases were screened by prosecutors) 15% of cases were disposed 
of in three days.322 By contrast, in Bexar County, which does not have prosecu-
tors screen any cases, 0% of the cases were resolved in three days.323 This data 
indicates that by having prosecutors screen cases and file charges electronically 
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(rather than waiting for police to forward their reports days or weeks later) the 
strongest cases are resolved quickly with many defendants pleading guilty in the 
first few days after arrest. These fast dispositions mean the counties spend less 
money on jail costs and defendants save money by extricating themselves from 
the system and getting back to their jobs. Researchers estimated that the faster 
case processing that comes with prosecutorial screening and electronic filing 
could save El Paso County $3.95 million and save defendants $3.26 million.324 
And, once again, this is just in misdemeanor cases. 
In sum, the researchers concluded that other jurisdictions should adopt 
twenty-four hour prosecutorial screening of warrantless arrests.325 The benefits 
included: a reduction (by up to 20%) in the number of charges, prompt disposi-
tion of charges that are filed, less paperwork for police, and more accurate charg-
ing decisions.326 Additionally, the researchers found that counties employing the 
Harris County model would save money because of reduced jail admissions, re-
duced inmate transportation costs, fewer court-appointed assignments, and less 
prosecutorial time spent on cases later in the process.327 They also recognized 
that “[w]here cases are screened out at arrest, defendants are spared the costs of 
private attorney fees, bond fees, lost wages, and family disruption in a case that 
would have ultimately been rejected by the prosecutor.”328 
2. Montgomery County Adopted a Similar System a Decade Ago 
Montgomery County, Texas—a medium sized county of slightly more than 
500,000 people—is directly north of Houston and occasionally hires former Har-
ris County prosecutors.329 In 2008, likely influenced by its southern neighbor, 
Montgomery County established its own intake system for prosecutors to screen 
warrantless arrests.330 Because it is a smaller office, Montgomery’s process is 
slightly different than that in Harris and El Paso.331 The core goal however—
having prosecutors assist police with warrantless arrests and carefully vet 
charges—is identical.332 
In Montgomery County, a rotating prosecutor is assigned to the jail twenty-
four hours per day to guide officers on charges and offer advice on evidence 
collection.333 Police either call the intake hotline or come in person to present 
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possible charges.334 The prosecutor then accepts the charges, modifies the of-
ficer’s proposed charges, or rejects the charges altogether.335 
The Montgomery County system actually began with prosecutors volun-
teering their time after hours because they saw the value in improving evidence 
collection and weeding out weak charges early in the process.336 Later, the sys-
tem became more formalized. Because it is smaller than Harris County, the 
Montgomery County intake process uses fewer prosecutors and staff members. 
A rotating prosecutor is assigned to the intake office during business hours and 
a different, permanent prosecutor works the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift.337 Be-
tween 5 p.m. and midnight and on weekends, prosecutors from other parts of the 
office work the intake shift for overtime pay.338 
Prosecutors in Montgomery County explained that the intake system pays 
for itself in a variety of ways. First, prosecutors are able to find the appropriate 
charges very early, rather than having to do that work later. Second, in cases 
where there is a victim—particularly family violence cases—prosecutors are 
able to move quickly to both protect the victim and to encourage her to cooperate 
with the prosecution rather than being convinced by the suspect to recant. Third, 
early involvement in the case enables prosecutors to have input on the bond 
amount, sometimes encouraging the judge to increase the amount to protect the 
community and other times suggesting a lower amount to remove less dangerous 
individuals from pretrial detention. 
IV. EXPANDING PROSECUTORIAL PRE-SCREENING OF WARRANTLESS ARRESTS 
TO OTHER COUNTIES 
The Harris County experience demonstrates that it is possible for a large 
prosecutor’s office to screen all warrantless arrests before police take suspects 
into custody. The experience in El Paso County (with a population of 660,000) 
and Montgomery County (with a population of 500,000) shows that it is feasible 
for prosecutors in medium-sized counties to prescreen all warrantless arrests.339 
Of course, implementing prosecutorial screening requires a considerable invest-
ment in up-front personnel costs. Large and medium-sized counties would have 
to hire one or more prosecutors (depending on the size of the office) to work the 
day shifts, and they would have to pay overtime for the evening and weekend 
shifts.340 But the cost savings in the long run from rejecting weak cases that 
would be later dismissed (as well as the other efficiencies described in Section 
III.B) would seemingly more than offset the personnel costs. Indeed, the Texas 
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A&M study comparing prosecutors’ offices that have intake offices with a 
county that does not screen cases demonstrated millions of dollars in potential 
savings to the counties and the defendants.341 As such, the simple policy pre-
scription of this Article is that large and medium-sized counties should follow 
the Harris County approach and have prosecutors prescreen all warrantless ar-
rests. 
A remaining question is whether prosecutorial screening of warrantless ar-
rests can be implemented in small counties. While large and medium-sized pros-
ecutor’s offices handle a majority of the criminal cases in the United States,342 it 
is nevertheless the case that most prosecutors’ offices in the United States are 
relatively small.343 Over 70% of prosecutor’s offices serve districts with popula-
tions of less than 100,000 people.344 And in those small districts, the average 
office has only four prosecutors.345 It simply would not be feasible for such 
leanly staffed offices to screen cases around the clock. 
A partial solution would be for states to fund intake prosecutors who can 
be shared by small counties.346 Prosecutors in a state office would answer calls 
from police around the state and approve, reject, or modify charges prior to war-
rantless arrests. If police seek to bring an obviously meritless case, or if they seek 
felony charges when only a misdemeanor prosecution would be appropriate, the 
state intake prosecutor would reject those charges, at least for the time being.347 
The case for state involvement is straightforward. First, with the exception 
of a small number of municipal offenses, state law sets forth criminal liability.348 
As such, state prosecutors are just as well situated as local prosecutors to deter-
mine whether a suspect’s conduct met the elements set forth in the state penal 
code.349 Second, because existing intake systems screen charges by phone, there 
is no need for the intake prosecutor to be in the same county as the police officer 
and the suspect. Third, while criminal prosecutions are mostly local in the United 
States, the decision to input a case into the criminal justice system affects numer-
ous entities outside of the locality. Public defenders and courts must use their 
state funding to deal with charges filed by police.350 Arrestees are often housed 
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in regional jails that handle inmates from multiple counties.351 States supervise 
those jails and the state attorney general’s office must deal with lawsuits about 
confinement conditions.352 Moreover, many local district attorneys’ offices al-
ready receive state funds to supplement their local budgets.353 In short, while 
criminal prosecutions are local—and will certainly remain that way354—there are 
systemic reasons for states to allot funds to weed out weak cases early in the 
process. 
Having state prosecutors answer an intake line would not threaten local 
control of charging decisions. If a state intake prosecutor were to reject a case, 
that would not bar further review by the local prosecutor. Police could still bring 
the case to the local prosecutor during normal business hours, and if the local 
prosecutor believed the case was strong enough, she could ask a magistrate to 
issue an arrest warrant. The state intake prosecutor would therefore only serve as 
a temporary speed bump for the weakest warrantless arrests. 
In the alternative, if the idea of a centralized state intake prosecutor is too 
radical, states could take a more modest step by simply providing grant funding 
to counties to hire their own local intake prosecutors. A number of prosecutor’s 
offices I spoke with suggested they would be interested in state funds to hire their 
own intake prosecutors.355 
V. CONCLUSION 
For many years, criminal justice reformers have paid close attention to ex-
cessively long sentences.356 Recently, reform efforts have focused on an earlier 
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part of the criminal justice system and sought to eliminate over-charging by pros-
ecutors357 and the practice of cash bail.358 While those are all worthy efforts, this 
Article suggests an even earlier intervention point. 
Almost all counties in the United States put initial arrest decisions in the 
hands of police, not prosecutors.359 In some large counties, prosecutors then step 
into the process within twelve hours.360 More commonly, prosecutors do not 
have a role until the probable cause hearing, which can be as late as forty-eight 
hours after arrest.361 And in some jurisdictions, prosecutors do not have any role 
until even later in the process, leaving suspects locked up for weeks before a 
prosecutor looks at the case.362 
In almost all jurisdictions, it is the police, not the prosecutor, who trigger a 
cascade of effects for arrestees.363 Warrantless arrests trigger a need to post bail; 
an increased deportation risk; the prospect of losing a job; public housing prob-
lems; and, particularly in misdemeanor cases, considerable pressure to plead 
guilty. Warrantless arrests also create work for jailers, clerks, judges, prosecu-
tors, and public defenders. 
The cascade of consequences triggered by warrantless arrests would not be 
concerning if we had confidence the police were not over-arresting and were 
filing the right set of charges. Yet strong evidence indicates reason for alarm. For 
decades, prosecutors across the country have dismissed 25% of the felony cases 
filed by police.364 There is no good data on the dismissal rates for misdemeanor 
cases, although basic common sense suggests dismissals are common when 
lower-stakes cases are involved. High dismissal rates tell us that the hands-off 
approach taken by most prosecutors is not only inefficient for the key players in 
the system but also unfair to the enormous number of arrestees who must suffer 
through the criminal justice process only to see the State later conclude there is 
no basis to proceed with their cases.365 
A few jurisdictions have found a better way. In Harris County, Texas—and 
at least two medium-sized counties that have followed suit—prosecutors screen 
all warrantless arrests.366 No one is taken to jail without a prosecutor first review-
ing the case.367 And prosecutors regularly reject charges while the potential ar-
restee is still on the street.368 The result is that suspects are released immediately 
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with low-level misdemeanors. See Rosenberg, supra note 208. 
 359. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 364.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 365.  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 266 (1979). 
 366. See supra Subsections III.C.1, III.C.2. 
 367. See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
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rather than being left to languish for days, weeks, or months before their cases 
are dismissed. 
The Harris County system involves considerable up-front costs because at 
least one prosecutor must be on duty twenty-four hours a day to review calls 
from police.369 The system is nevertheless logistically and financially feasible. 
Many prosecutor’s offices already have hotlines in place for police to ask prose-
cutors questions.370 Calls to these hotlines would simply become mandatory ra-
ther than optional. And while the costs of staffing prosecutors twenty-four hours 
a day would be considerable, counties would recoup the costs (and likely even 
see overall costs decline) by saving money on jail admissions, transportation of 
inmates, unnecessary police reports, court costs, and public defender involve-
ment, to name just a few. In short, counties have the opportunity to simultane-
ously reduce harm to arrestees and limit the workload of numerous criminal jus-
tice actors by having prosecutors pre-screen warrantless arrests. 
  
 
 369. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
